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I love this little book. And one feels that the author loves it, too. It seems as if Fran
Waksler had to become a professor emerita (from Wheelock College) in order to
finally complete an old pet project. The incident that she investigated happened a
long time ago, in January 1973. A man who was later identified as Mark James
Essex fired a gun on several floors in a downtown hotel in New Orleans, LA and
shot 16 people, 7 of whom died, until he was eventually gunned down by the police
when sniping from the roof. But the shooting went on the next day as there
presumably existed a second sniper; seven more policemen were wounded, but the
second sniper was never found. While the police were first convinced that there was
a second sniper, they changed their official assessment over time, based on the
collected evidence, and came to the conclusion that there was only one sniper as a
second one could not have escaped from the site. The wounded police officers
during the shootings on the next day were ‘‘obviously’’ victims of police ricochets.
Waksler poses the thrilling research question of ‘‘how that second sniper was first
constituted and later unconstituted’’ (2010: 3). The book reads like a detective story
where the search for the second murderer is the central theme. The second bad guy,
however, never gets caught and so the first assumption is finally revised: a second
sniper never existed. The reader is led through the different interpretations of the
situation by diverse parties but in the end is being left with the fundamental
uncertainty: Was there ever a second sniper who managed to escape in mysterious
ways or was he just a misconception, a false belief? Was it just Mark Essex who did
it all—and as he was killed, justice prevails? We will never know the truth…The
book is well written and well structured. The preface frames it biographically, the
introduction presents the project, the event, the data and the timeline of key events.
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the context and the evidence of constituting the Other
(the second sniper), and chapter 4 scrutinizes how the Other is unconstituted in the
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aftermath. In a conclusion some basic features are suggested that proved to be
relevant to the constitution of the other. In an appendix the witnesses’ sightings and
descriptions are listed in a table ordered by time and place.
A phenomenological case study
The project is to pursue a phenomenological case study of constituting the Other:
‘‘My goal is to follow Husserl’s recommendation to explore how, in a given
situation, an Other is constituted, how people, with their general procedures and
resources, use them to constitute an Other in a specific situation—one in which the
very existence of that Other is problematic’’ (2010: 3; emphasis in original).
Waksler intends to apply Husserl’s ideas to this particular instance in order to
illuminate the intricate processes whereby an Other is constituted. If the Other is
problematic and ambiguous, the underlying work of constituting the Other becomes
visible—work that in everyday life sustains the given character of the Other; work
that is essential but normally goes unnoticed. By juxtaposing newspaper reports
with quotations from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (and other books) the author
demonstrates how Husserl’s phenomenological ideas help to analyze empirical data.
The data consists primarily of contemporary reports in two New Orleans
newspapers and in the (889-page) New Orleans Police Department Report.
Additional data was consulted: tapes of television news reports, written summaries,
and the author’s own memories of hearing and reading about the event. It is
explicitly pointed out that these data are not considered as objective or factual—
after all, stories must be ‘‘newsworthy’’ and police work ‘‘justifiable’’—but they
‘‘rely upon and provide versions of common-sense accounts of the doings of a
problematic Other’’ (2010: 5). The following book chapters analyze these in more
detail.
The analysis of the constitution of the Other (2010: 9–39) is primarily based on
the newspaper reports. Waksler elucidates how a specific context of previous events
favors certain assumptions for framing the sniper incident and how these first
assumptions prevail when framing the subsequent events. Then she shows how the
police reasoned about what one person is capable of doing—one cannot, for
instance, be at two places at once. A related question is what an ordinary person is
capable of doing and what an extraordinary person might accomplish. Next, she
turns to explore the signs of an Other: others can be seeable, hearable, or recognized
by signs of turn-taking (i.e., of reciprocity). Further signs may be leavings of an
Other, which Waksler terms ‘‘disembodied evidence,’’ including ballistic evidence.
Further frames were delivered by speculation and conspiracy theories. As the
ambiguity persisted about whether a second sniper existed, the deliberations went
on. The author shows how either/or explanations were used and assessed. She also
points out ‘legitimating evidence’: ‘‘evidence was assessed and legitimated not only
in terms of its content but also in relation to who offered it’’ (2010: 37; emphasis in
original). Police reports were considered the most accurate.
The analysis of the unconstitution of the Other (2010: 41–73) in the aftermath is
primarily based on the lengthy police report. Waksler reconstructs how the evidence
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is reworked. She follows the same criteria and structure as in the previous chapter:
how is the evidence reinterpreted considering what one person is capable of doing
and taking into account the signs that were seeable, hearable, and identified as turn-
taking (reciprocity). The author shows how the police eventually reassessed the
collected contradicting evidences and finally concluded that a second sniper would
have been rather unlikely. Waksler’s careful reconstruction of the instances of
constituting a second sniper and later unconstituting him is meticulously illustrated
by excerpts from the reports. This makes the story very lively and thrilling to read.
Based on her findings, Waksler draws the conclusion (2010: 75–78) that there are
specific features relevant to the constitution of the Other: 1. The existence of an
Other is plausible: Plausibility is a starting-point but further evidence is required
which confirms the existence of this Other. In the sniper-case there was conflicting
evidence. 2. A person is a kinetic/tactile-kinesthetic body that is visible, audible,
and capable of movement. Such signs are used as evidence of an Other but can, of
course, get misinterpreted. 3. Indications of present or past action can stand for the
existence of an Other but can also be reinterpreted: Attributing actions to a specific
actor, for instance, involves references that may be contested later on. 4. A person is
subject to physical laws and cannot be, e.g., in two places at once. 5. A person is
also subject to common-sense rules and is seen as ‘acting like a person,’ ‘acting like
a sniper,’ ‘acting like a police officer’. Such category-bound activities are used to
attribute certain types of behaviors and utterances to either the sniper or the police
officers. 6. Construction of an Other takes place in social settings: A witness may be
convinced of what was observed, but such claims are made in social situations and
get either confirmed or denied. Furthermore, the postulated reliability of perceptions
and observations are discussed in the light of the conditions under which they
happened—stress, limited visibility, confusing circumstances, danger.
Waksler suggests that these features are relevant to the constitution of any Other,
not just to the constitution of a problematic Other, and she refutes the idea that an
Other can be ‘‘directly grasped’’. Even if the ‘givenness’ of the Other is
unproblematic in everyday life, there is always ‘‘work’’ involved: the—normally
unnoticed—work of constituting the Other. She closes with two excerpts from
Husserl in order to demonstrate that she followed his advice here to systematically
explicate the overt and implicit intentionality in which the Other is constituted and
‘made’ (2010: 78).
How does a phenomenological analysis proceed?
It makes a big difference if you read this book with background knowledge of
phenomenology or not—you frame things differently. In a recent book review
Mackenzie (2011: 1077) states that Waksler just used excerpts from Husserl without
further explaining the phenomenological approach and the fundamental concepts,
perspectives, and tools in their own right. This needs not be taken as a critique, but
is certainly a valid point that is worth further scrutiny. For novices to phenom-
enology, on the one hand, it may be difficult to get a clear grasp of how a
phenomenological analysis of the constitution of the Other actually proceeds and
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what all those Husserlian terms, like appresentation, certainty, contradiction,
evidence, experience, harmoniousness, illusion, imminent data, intentionality, other,
physical things, pseudo-organism, relativity, and sphere of ownness—all listed in
the index (2010: 100)—actually mean. Phenomenologists, on the other hand, may
be surprised how seamlessly Waksler uses Husserl’s phenomenological analyses in
the transcendental sphere for an interpretation of empirical, sociological data. This
is particularly surprising for those who posit that phenomenology and sociology are
two distinctly different enterprises that should not be mingled.
A clear distinction between phenomenology and sociology was advocated by
Thomas Luckmann for methodological reasons. He posits (Luckmann 1973, 1979;
transl. and quoted in Eberle 2012a: 282f.):
1. Phenomenology is a philosophy. It analyses phenomena of subjective
consciousness. Its perspective is egological and its method proceeds reflexively.
Its goal is to describe the universal structures of subjective orientation in the
life-world.
2. Sociology is a science. It analyses phenomena of the social world. Its
perspective is cosmological and its method proceeds inductively. Its goal is to
explain the general properties of the objective world.
Husserl’s phenomenology analyzes the constitution of phenomena in the
intentionality of subjective consciousness. The consciousness is always conscious-
ness of something and operates in the way of ego cogito cogitatum, meaning that
phenomena are always constituted as a unity of noetic and noematic aspects in an
ego’s subjective consciousness. This is why a phenomenological analysis proceeds
egologically. Phenomena are not just sensuous but meaningful, which is why
phenomenology analyzes their meaning, i.e., their ‘sense’. A phenomenologist
analyzes (meaningful) perceptions and experiences as constituted in his or her own
subjective consciousness. The phenomena of consciousness are experienced as a
stream, as a temporal flow; an egological analysis proceeds reflexively: how are
phenomena constituted in (inner) time. Sociology, in contrast, investigates how
other members of society experience the world. Sociologists do not analyze their
own subjective experience, but they rather collect empirical data about society.
Based on this data they develop inductively theoretical interpretations of what goes
on in the social world. Preferably, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) suggested, they
research society as an objective as well as a subjective reality (as two sides of the
same coin)—however, not the sociologists’ but the members’ subjective reality.
By way of the phenomenological method, Husserl strived for elucidating the
universal formal structures of the life-world (Husserl 1936/1970). The eidetic
method brackets stepwise all the contingencies of a phenomenon in order to
explicate its eidos, its essence. And the transcendental method even goes a step
further by bracketing the very existence of phenomena or, in other words,
bracketing any interest in ontological considerations. Husserl was convinced that if
we strip the mundane ego from all the assumptions which we use in everyday life
we would arrive at the transcendental ego that succeeds to grasp essences and
constitutive acts with evidence and apodictic certainty. Hence, the results of
Husserl’s phenomenological analyses are meant to have universal validity.
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The Structures of the Life-World by Alfred Schutz, coedited by Luckmann, were
worked out in the same vein: as universal structures that apply to any human on
earth—although Schutz pursued a mundane, not a transcendental phenomenology
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973, 1989). That is why these structures are also
designated, in line with Max Scheler, as a ‘philosophical anthropology’ (Srubar
1988, 2005). Their (postulated) universal character explains the affinity of Berger
and Luckmann’s sociological approach to the philosophical anthropology of
Plessner and Gehlen (1966: 65ff.). Luckmann (1973, 1979) calls the inquiry on the
‘structures of the life-world’ a protosociology—they provide, as Schutz intended it,
a philosophical foundation to the methodology of the social sciences. They
represent a basic matrix, a tertium comparationis for the empirical sociological,
historical, and cultural data. For Luckmann, you do either phenomenology or
sociology: you do phenomenology if you further elaborate the universal structures
of the life-world by way of an egological, reflexive analysis, or you do sociology if
you research general properties of the concrete, empirical social world.1 But there is
no such thing as a ‘phenomenological sociology,’ this label is—in Luckmann’s
eyes—a misnomer.
Given Luckmann’s eminent intellectual influence, this clear-cut distinction
between phenomenology and sociology is widely disseminated among German
sociologists. Most of them avoid the label ‘phenomenological sociology’ and clearly
distinguish between a phenomenological and a sociological analysis. Some engage
in a so-called ‘parallel action’—they analyze a phenomenon phenomenologically
(egologically) and in parallel also sociologically in order to elucidate the
protosociological as well as the sociological aspects. Jochen Dreher, for instance,
recently presented a ‘protosociology of friendship’ (2009). Sociologists in the
German language area usually use the self-description ‘sociology of knowledge,’
sometimes specified as a ‘phenomenologically founded sociology of knowledge’. It
is therefore a misconception when Bentz (2010: 207) states—citing Eberle (2010)—
that there is ‘‘no phenomenological sociology in Germany’’—there exist just
different designations based on Luckmann’s distinction.
On these grounds, it is comparatively easy to predict that German phenomenol-
ogists and sociologists would not consider Waksler’s case study as being ‘phenom-
enological’. The sniper study is not based on subjective experiences but on verbal
accounts, on written descriptions. A Husserlian phenomenologist pursues an analysis
of how phenomena are constituted in his or her subjective consciousness. This allows
the study of their givenness in its most subtle aspects. A crucial phenomenological
insight is, for instance, the distinction between the pre-predicative level and the
predicative level, as worked out, e.g., in Husserl’s Experience and Judgment (1948/
1973). The Other is normally constituted on a pre-predicative level by passive
syntheses in subjective consciousness. A basic phenomenological insight is that there
are already basic typifications involved on this pre-predicative level, which marks a
basic difference between phenomenology and semiotic approaches. When using signs,
1 A certain complication arises here as Schutz’s life-world analysis not only comprised a subjective,
phenomenological pole but also a pragmatic, action-related pole. I have recently depicted this point
elsewhere (Eberle 2012a, 2012b).
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however, we are entering a different level, namely the predicative level. This is the
level of judgments and inferences where typifications of a higher level and of more
complexity are used. Here we find many similarities to semiotic approaches.
While Waksler is using written descriptions as data, she cannot analyze the
experiences and the intentionalities of the persons involved in the event; her
analysis is restricted to how experiences and observations were described in the
newspaper and police reports. In German ‘phenomenological sociology’—to use an
abbreviated form of ‘phenomenologically founded sociology of knowledge’—such
distinctions are crucial. We have only direct access to our own experiences and can
learn about the experiences of Others only by way of communication. Even in
qualitative sociology many researchers falsely talk about the ‘experiences of others’
as if verbal accounts would represent those experiences. In fact, they are dealing
with verbal accounts and narrations that may depict the experiences of others but
certainly do not represent them. The power of phenomenology rests in its potential
to analyze subjective experiences before they are formulated on the predicative
level in linguistic form. If we attempt to grasp the experiences of others we cannot
proceed phenomenologically but must take a hermeneutic approach.
Hence, in German sociology phenomenology serves to elaborate protosociology,
while the related sociology of knowledge proceeds hermeneutically. In line with this
distinction, the later Luckmann (2007) proposed to reserve the term ‘constitution’
for the constitution of experiences in subjective consciousness and use the term
‘construction’ for the social process of reality constructions. This would render the
terminology more consistent. On these grounds, Waksler’s sniper study would be
seen as dealing with the construction of the Other but not with the constitution, and
therefore not being a phenomenological study, but an approach within the sociology
of knowledge. Waksler coherently speaks of ‘constituting and unconstituting the
Other’ but she uses twice, maybe by accident, also the wording ‘construction of the
Other’ (2010: 9, 77)—without listing the term in the index. Which difference do
such theoretical distinctions make—besides being intellectually more elaborated?
Well, I think it is quite illuminating to distinguish between experiences-as-they-are-
experienced and communicative—mostly verbal—accounts of experiences. It is
crucial for a phenomenological perspective to see—and mark—this difference,
otherwise we could as well adopt a linguistic approach that equates experiences with
their verbal representation.
These distinctions also raise questions in regard to Waksler’s use of Husserl’s
excerpts. The author has shown in detail how events were reinterpreted in the light
of different assumptions. Could it be that Husserl’s statements mean different things
when applied to these newspaper and police reports than when read in the context of
the phenomenological analysis in the transcendental sphere? After all, his
statements referred to the intentionality of subjective consciousness and not to
verbal descriptions of experiences and observations of others. Among the ten
excerpts from Husserl the author uses in her book, it is probably fair to examine
those two she uses in her conclusion. There she claims that she sought for a
systematic explication, as Husserl suggested:
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It is necessary to begin with a systematic explication of the overt and implicit
intentionality in which the being of others for me becomes ‘made’ and
explicated in respect of its rightful content—that is, its fulfillment-content
(Fifth Cartesian Meditation 1960: 91–92). (Waksler 2010: 78)
It is evident that Husserl analyzes how the Other is constituted in subjective
consciousness where he has direct access to the pre-predicative level. Waksler,
given her data, inevitably restricts analysis to the predicative level. Furthermore, she
reconstructs on the basis of these reports how others constituted (constructed) an
Other. This is certainly a different access to the intentionality of subjective
consciousness than Husserl advocated.
A crucial conclusion of Waksler is that ‘‘(t)he existence of a given Other is thus
necessarily relative and tentative, subject to later confirmation and refutation’’
(2010: 78). And she quotes Husserl:
(T)he world is never given to the subject and the communities of subjects in any
other way than as the subjectively relative valid world with particular experiential
content and as a world which, in and through subjectivity, takes on ever new
transformations of meaning; and that even the apodictically persisting conviction
of one and the same world, exhibiting itself subjectively in changing ways, is a
conviction motivated purely within subjectivity, a conviction whose sense—the
world itself, the actually existing world—never surpasses the subjectivity that
brings it about (Husserl, n.d.: 337). (Waksler 2010: 78)
Waksler raises an important point when arguing that the wording ‘‘grasping the
Other’’ is inadequate, the Other is rather constituted (2010: 78). It is however
striking that she uses Husserl to underpin a kind of subjective relativism. In the
excerpt above, Husserl stresses the noetic aspects of phenomena; hence he
concludes that ‘‘the apodictically persisting conviction of one and the same world
(…) is a conviction motivated purely within subjectivity’’. And he is aware that a
phenomenological analysis that equates truth with evidence is inevitably bound to
the phenomenologist’s subjectively relative experiences. Husserl’s goal, however, is
to overcome the subjectively relative contents of experiences and explicate the
fundamental structures of the life-world that have universal validity. Therefore, he
explicitly opposed the claims of psychologism and relativism. In Waksler’s study,
however, phenomenological analysis is not used to gain essential or apodictic
insights; the substantiating evidences of truth are rather dislocated from the
phenomenologist’s subjective consciousness to the subjective perceptions of the
participants that were involved in the event, in one way or the other, to their
narrative accounts of a second sniper and to the social processes of interactional and
institutional deliberation about which version seems more likely.
How does phenomenological sociology proceed?
Fran Waksler comes from a different background. She describes herself as a
‘phenomenological sociologist’ and writes: ‘‘Phenomenology has offered me a
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congenial philosophical framework for doing sociology. It counsels minimizing
assumptions and letting the data speak for itself’’ (www.franceswaksler.com).
Within this framework she has investigated face-to-face interaction and a range of
topics in the sociologies of childhood, of deviance, medicine, and family (Waksler
1991, 1996; Douglas and Waksler 1982). The sniper study is actually linked to the
topic of her dissertation, The Essential Structures of Face-to-Face Interaction: A
Phenomenological Analysis (Waksler 1973; Psathas and Waksler 1973) which she
was finishing just when the New Orleans incident was broadcasted in the TV-news.
Waksler was intellectually socialized at Boston University as one of the early
doctoral students of George Psathas, who became one of the prominent represen-
tatives of a phenomenological sociology (Psathas 1973, 1989; see Eberle 2012b;
Nasu 2012; Nasu and Waksler 2012). Psathas learned about phenomenology
through the writings of Harold Garfinkel (1967) and although he read the original
publications of Husserl, Schutz, and Gurwitsch and even attended seminars of
Herbert Spiegelberg, his interpretations remained strongly influenced by ethno-
methodology. As one of a few ethnomethodologists, he kept close ties to
phenomenology as well as ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. And
although he carefully discussed the differences and commonalities between
Schutz’s phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and other versions of the sociology
of knowledge (Psathas 1989, 2004, 2009), he takes up an integrative stance—or an
‘‘assimilative approach’’ (Bird 2009)—probably motivated by the breadth of the
Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg 1982). Psathas designated ethnometh-
odology explicitly as ‘a phenomenological approach in the social sciences’ (Psathas
1989: 79–98), and he was convinced that phenomenological sociology offered a
promising alternative to the restricted potential of positivist perspectives—at the
time behaviorism and structural functionalism.
Waksler developed her approach in this context. In an early paper on the question
‘‘Is a Phenomenological Sociology Possible?’’ (1969) she defines ‘‘phenomenolog-
ical sociology as a synthesis of phenomenology and sociology’’. Every sociological
theory has not only an implicit theory of personality but also ‘‘an implicit theory of the
nature of reality and of knowledge, an embedded ontology and epistemology’’ (1969:
2). Hence every sociological approach can be preceded by a ‘‘philosophical
adjective’’: While phenomenological sociology does so explicitly, positivist social
theories routinely do not. Phenomenology allows sociologists ‘‘to make explicit all
the assumptions about reality and knowledge’’ that they hold. By focusing
phenomena phenomenologically, ‘‘it also becomes possible to study social structures,
social institutions, and large-scale phenomena in terms of how they come to be
constituted’’ (1969: 3). This requires that static macro-sociological concepts get
replaced by a perspective that investigates the interactions of involved participants in
concrete, real-life settings. In regard to methodology, she proposes the descriptive
methodology that is basic to phenomenology, citing Spiegelberg (1982). The
methodological question ‘‘How do we know what we know?’’ helps to explicate
implicit assumptions. As an example she refers to Garfinkel, who investigates
‘‘phenomena which in the past have been viewed as ‘given,’ e.g., gender dichotomy,
age categories’’ (1969: 5). Waksler’s approach to a phenomenological sociology
implies working with assumptions different from those of positivist science;
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questioning implicit assumptions about reality and knowledge with which sociolo-
gists operate; and asking how social phenomena that previously were seen as ‘‘given’’
are constituted.
The basic research question of how social phenomena are constituted or how they
are socially constructed would probably never have had such an impact on
sociology without the phenomenological movement. The different strands of
phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, social
constructivism and constructionism have shown in numerous studies how prolific
this perspective is. How does Waksler proceed?
In her research life Waksler has worked with different sorts of data. In the sniper
study she used written reports as her main source. It is not an ethnography, as many
phenomenological sociologists strive for, since the author could not pursue
participant observation in the field. And nowadays it would have been too late to
interview participants—their memories would be too imprecise. But the data also
comprised 132 interviews with police officers and dozens of interviews with
firefighters, hotel guests, hotel employees, and other witnesses. As this is a historical
study, it was completely adequate to rely on written documents. The author
investigates, in a way, the ‘‘documentary construction of reality’’2 in regard to the
second sniper.
It is my firm impression that Waksler could not have done this study without the
inspiration she drew from phenomenology. It is evident that she used much more
background knowledge of phenomenology than she indicated by the ten excerpts
from Husserl and by her further references. Like Garfinkel, she uses phenomeno-
logical analyses as a source of inspiration. The influence of ethnomethodology can
be recognized in some of her terminology, for instance when she speaks of
‘‘(u)nderstanding the resources that people use as they define an Other as an Other’’
(2010: 2; emphasis added), of seeking ‘‘answers in the practices employed’’ (2010:
5), of exploring which ‘‘general procedures and resources’’ people use (2010: 3), of
‘‘in situ evidence’’ (2010: 3; emphasis in original), of the ‘‘work that went … into
determining that there was at least a second sniper’’ (2010: 3; emphasis in original),
of ‘‘common-sense accounts of the doings of a problematic Other’’ (2010: 5), or of
the ‘‘common-sense reasoning’’ of participants (2010: 37; emphasis added).
Contrary to Garfinkel, she does not use phenomenological inspiration in order to
devise a sociological approach like ethnomethodology; she uses phenomenological
findings directly to interpret her data.3 She investigates the mundane reasoning of
the participants, carves out the implied assumptions and elucidates the evidences
that participants report—each illustrated by excerpts from their accounts. Husserl’s
phenomenological analyses of the constitution of the Other undoubtedly helped her
in organizing her huge amount of data. And in the end, her own analysis provided a
number of fundamental features of the constitution of the Other in mundane
reasoning that are highly plausible and may even have universal validity (something
that Waksler would not claim).
2 But not the social construction of documentary reality as Smith (1974) suggested.
3 For a more theoretical phenomenological account of the constitution of the Other see Nasu (2005).
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Conclusion
I used Waksler’s ‘‘phenomenological case study of constituting the Other’’ to
ponder how a phenomenological analysis proceeds and how phenomenological
sociology proceeds. I argued that this nice little study will be received differently
among German sociologists who apply Luckmann’s clear-cut distinction between
phenomenology and sociology and among American sociologists who were
socialized in the context of ethnomethodology and phenomenological sociology.
In the frame of German phenomenological sociologists, the sniper study is pursued
with a sociology of knowledge approach that proceeds hermeneutically, attempting
to understand how the participants of this event constructed reality and which
assumptions, evidences, typifications, and inferences they employed. It would not
be accepted as a proper ‘phenomenological’ study as the perceptions and
experiences are not accessed directly—i.e., in subjective intuition—but rather
reconstructed indirectly on the basis of written reports. In the frame of American
phenomenological sociologists, these distinctions may appear rather sophistic given
their interest in empirical studies. Waksler, as an example, seems to be more
interested in analyzing the empirical data than in the intricacies of the theoretical
debates on phenomenology and sociology. The results she presents are interesting,
sometimes even thrilling, and certainly innovative.
Let me close by pointing out that there are new developments in German
phenomenological sociology, even in the context of Luckmann’s distinction
between phenomenology and sociology. I have identified three new developments
that have a direct link to empirical research (see Eberle in print): 1. The
phenomenological analysis of small social life-worlds is also called ‘life-world
analytic ethnography’. It incorporates phenomenology by explicitly and reflexively
using the subjective experience of the researcher as an ‘instrument’ of data
generation and collection. By observing participation—as opposed to participant
observation—the researcher tries to analyze experiences on a pre-predicative level,
before they are formulated in language. 2. ‘Phenomenological hermeneutics’
attempts to explore the subjective experiences of an alter ego. It requires
communication, e.g., narrative interviews, operating on the basis of data on a
predicative level. The subtleness of a phenomenological perspective may help to
elucidate deeper layers of sense-connexions of the other’s experiences. 3.
Ethnophenomenology pursues empirical research of non-observable, extraordinary
experiences of actors, like visionary experiences, near-death experiences, or
religious experiences. As such experiences are inaccessible to ‘normal’ phenom-
enologists, they cannot analyze them in their own subjective consciousness.
Ethnophenomenology explores not only the contents but also the mode of
extraordinary experiences of others, hence ‘ethno’-phenomenology.
Waksler’s analysis comes closest to phenomenological hermeneutics although by
using written reports she cannot get any deeper in exploring other’s experiences
than the data disclose. But phenomenological hermeneutics also rests on the
(heuristic) premise that the protosociological, universal structures which the
phenomenological life-world analysis revealed apply to anybody. On the same
grounds, Waksler could argue that Husserl’s findings which he gained by his
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phenomenological analysis in the transcendental sphere of subjective consciousness
are true for anybody. Hence this legitimates her direct application of Husserl’s
insights to empirical, sociological data. Phenomenological insights help her to make
sense of these data, to analyze how they were socially constructed but also to refer
to subjective experiences as described in the reports. Her analysis does not further
elaborate Husserl’s phenomenology, but Husserl’s phenomenology undoubtedly
helped her in her analysis of sociological data. What else can a phenomenologically
informed sociology hope for?
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